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THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER LISBON: 
ESTABLISHING PARALLELISM BETWEEN INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS?
Angelos Dimopoulos*
Summary: This article examines how the substantive changes brought 
by the Lisbon Treaty with regard to the scope and nature of Commu-
nity competence and to decision-making rules in the fi eld of the Com-
mon Commercial Policy fulfi l the need for balancing internal and exter-
nal action and stand up to the requirements of international economic 
regulation. It is argued that the Lisbon Treaty, building upon the prem-
ises of the current regime, constitutes a benchmark in the evolution 
of the Common Commercial Policy. The expansion of the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy to trade in services, commercial aspects 
of intellectual property and, most importantly, foreign direct invest-
ment indicates that a common policy in the fi elds of goods, services, 
establishment and capital with regard to third countries is necessary 
in order to serve the goals of internal integration and to increase the 
competitiveness of Europe in the world. Furthermore, by “merging” the 
different aspects of the Common Commercial Policy and simplifying the 
provisions concerning the exercise of EU competence, the Lisbon Treaty 
ensures its effective application. However, the “merger” of the different 
aspects of the Common Commercial Policy does not affect the balance 
of powers that exists in the internal market with regard to the same 
areas of law. The only derogations from parallelism between internal 
and external powers concern the exclusive nature of EU competence 
and the role of the European Parliament. However, these are both nec-
essary for preserving the effectiveness of Union policy and introducing 
legitimacy in the most important fi eld of EU external relations.
1. Introduction
The Common Commercial Policy has been one of the most impor-
tant and dynamic fi elds of EU external relations. Since its inception in 
1957, the scope of the Common Commercial Policy has been signifi cantly 
changed in order to adapt to the new realities of international trade and 
economic relations. During the 1990s, the Common Commercial Policy 
was the subject of signifi cant amendments. In Amsterdam and in Nice, 
the scope of the Common Commercial Policy was expanded and a com-
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plex and ambiguous system of rules was created. In order to strengthen 
coherence in the formation and application of the Common Commercial 
Policy and to clarify the complex system created after Nice, the Constitu-
tional Treaty1 and subsequently the Lisbon Treaty2 introduced new pro-
visions concerning the Common Commercial Policy within the general 
framework of EU external action.
The evolutionary character of the Common Commercial Policy re-
veals that EC external trade and economic relations have undergone ma-
jor changes in order to adapt to internal and international challenges. 
The demands of globalisation and the trend towards the liberalisation of 
international economic regulation, as mainly expressed by the formation 
of the WTO, required an expansion of EC trade policy towards other fi elds 
of economic activity. This trend was also supported by the completion of 
the internal market, which demanded the formation of a common exter-
nal economic policy beyond trade in goods. The Treaties of Amsterdam 
and Nice presented the fi rst steps towards building a coherent external 
trade and economic policy. The Lisbon Treaty attempts to fi ll the remain-
ing gaps and simplify the rules on the Common Commercial Policy.
Signed on 13 December 2007, the Lisbon Treaty amends the EC 
and the EU Treaties and provides a new constitutional charter for the 
EU. After the stalemate and eventual failure of the Constitutional Treaty, 
the IGC in Lisbon fi nalised a new version of the founding Treaties which 
includes signifi cant institutional and substantive changes. An important 
fi eld of EU/EC action which is the subject of important changes is EU 
external relations. The Lisbon Treaty, following the pattern of the Consti-
tutional Treaty, merges all fi elds that formerly came under EC external 
action into a single chapter of the new Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), and links it with the chapter on external action 
in the EU Treaty (TEU) with the aim of enhancing consistency and unity 
in EU external relations.3 
The Common Commercial Policy constitutes a fi eld of EU external 
action subject to the same principles and objectives as well as the same 
institutional rules that establish a common framework for EU external 
action.4 Aiming at clarifying and simplifying the complex rules of Article 
1  Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C310 of 16 December 2004.
2  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed in Lisbon, 13 December [2007] OJ C306 of 17 December 2007. 
3  For an overview of the constitutional framework of EU External Relations under the 
Constitutional Treaty see M Cremona, A Constitutional Basis for Effective External Action? 
An Assessment of the Provisions on EU External Action in the Constitutional Treaty, EUI 
Working Paper Law No 2006/30. 
4  Article 205 TFEU states that ‘the Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant 
to this Part, shall be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in 
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133 TEC, the new Article 207 TFEU brings signifi cant changes to the 
scope of the Common Commercial Policy, to its nature and its objectives. 
It is noteworthy that the Lisbon Treaty kept the text of the Constitutional 
Treaty on the Common Commercial Policy almost intact. Changing only 
the references to Treaty Articles and legal instruments, the IGC in Lisbon 
confi rmed the need to change the Common Commercial Policy, thus ren-
dering the negotiating history of the Constitutional Treaty relevant for the 
interpretation of the provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.
During the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty, the European 
Convention dealt with the need for reform of the Common Commercial 
Policy based on the principles of effectiveness, simplifi cation and legiti-
macy.5 The problems posed by the ambiguous provisions on decision-
making and the exceptions to the Qualifi ed Majority Vote (QMV) rule, 
the reduced role of the European Parliament, the confusing references 
to shared competences and the need for extension of the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy to include foreign investment were the major 
issues that were discussed at the European Convention.6 Acknowledging 
the existence of divergent proposals on these issues, the fi nal draft of the 
Constitutional Treaty was a compromise between those opting for a far-
reaching expansion of the Community’s role and those favouring only a 
slight expansion of the Community’s tasks, safeguarding the interests of 
Member States in the fi eld.
This article examines the substantive changes brought by the Lis-
bon Treaty with regard to the scope, the nature and the exercise of EU 
competence. Taking into account the evolutionary character of the Com-
mon Commercial Policy, this article focuses on the delimitation of powers 
and discusses how the Lisbon amendments fulfi l the need for balancing 
internal and external action7 and stand up to the requirements of in-
ternational economic regulation.8 Within this framework, an analysis of 
accordance with the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1 of Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union’.
5  European Convention, summary of the meeting held on 15 October 2002 of Working 
Group VII, CONV/356/02.
6  M. Krajewski, ‘External Trade Law and the Constitutional Treaty: Towards a federal and 
more democratic common Commercial Policy?’ (2005) 42 CMLR 102-103.
7  Due to the various meanings given in the literature to the terms “external” and “internal” 
with regard to Community competence, these terms are used in this article in order to de-
fi ne whether the scope of Community action extends to relations with third countries and 
their nationals. In order to distinguish between the types of action taken, namely between 
secondary Community legislation and international agreements or other international law 
instruments, the terms “autonomous measures” and “international agreements” are used 
respectively.
8  An analysis of the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the orientation and future implementa-
tion of the Common Commercial Policy goes beyond the scope of this article and will only 
be complementarily addressed.
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the changes to the scope of EU competence in the fi eld of the Common 
Commercial Policy is fi rstly provided, highlighting the completion and 
simplifi cation of EU powers in the areas of trade in services and com-
mercial aspects of intellectual property and the ambiguities arising from 
the inclusion of foreign direct investment within the scope of EU com-
petence. Secondly, the article examines the effects of the Lisbon Treaty 
on the exclusive nature of EU competence, in particular in light of the 
need for parallelism between external and internal Community powers. 
Finally, the amendments of decision-making rules are scrutinised, look-
ing in particular at whether and to what extent they satisfy the principles 
of effectiveness, simplifi cation and legitimacy that triggered the reform of 
the Common Commercial Policy.
2. The scope of EU competence
The scope of EU competence in the fi eld of the Common Commercial 
Policy is affected signifi cantly by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 207 TFEU 
expands the scope of the Common Commercial Policy, while providing 
a clearer wording with regard to Community competences already exist-
ing under the current regime. It attempts to provide a more balanced 
approach with regard to the relationship between internal and external 
competences, and a single legal basis for the adoption of all measures 
that are necessary for the operation and implementation of the Common 
Commercial Policy.
a) EU competence in areas of trade in services and commercial 
aspects of intellectual property
The fi rst signifi cant change brought by the Lisbon Treaty is that it 
introduces clear rules with regard to the scope of Community competence 
in the areas of trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual 
property (hereinafter IP), which has been one of the most controversial 
and ambiguous fi elds of EU external competence. Since the creation of 
the WTO, which established international rules on trade in services and 
trade-related IP rights, the EC has struggled to determine its scope of 
competence in these areas and delimitate it from Member States’ powers. 
The existence of the EC’s exclusive competence to conclude the GATS9 
and TRIPS10 agreements was the focus of the benchmark decision of the 
Court of Justice in Opinion 1/9411 and later on, as a reaction to the strict 
interpretation of Article 133 TEC, of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. 
9  General Agreement on Trade in Services [1994] OJ L336/190.
10  Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [1994] OJ 
L336/213.  
11  Opinion 1/94 WTO [1994] ECR I-5267.
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i) The emergence of EU competence in areas of trade in services and 
commercial aspects of intellectual property
In Opinion 1/94, the Court took the stance that Article 133 TEC, 
as it stood at the time, did not grant exclusive competence to the EC to 
conclude the GATS and TRIPS Agreements. With regard to GATS, the 
Court pointed out that the EC Treaty includes specifi c chapters on the 
free movement of persons, emphasising in essence the structural differ-
ences between the four freedoms in the internal sphere and their refl ec-
tion in external relations.12 With regard to TRIPS, the Court opined that 
the majority of TRIPS provisions were outside the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy, as their primary purpose was not the regulation of 
trade but the harmonisation of IP rights protection. The Court’s Opinion 
has been heavily criticised,13 as it demonstrated the Court’s reluctance 
to extend the notion of international trade beyond goods to services and 
establishment, signalling that the Common Commercial Policy could not 
be expanded to the Common Economic Policy but that it should be bal-
anced with the internal competence in the fi eld of services, establishment 
and IP regulation.14 
Following Opinion 1/94 and its unclear delineation of competence, the 
IGC in Nice expanded the scope of the Common Commercial Policy to trade 
in services and trade-related aspects of IP, creating, however, a complex 
system of rules. The Nice Treaty kept intact paragraphs 1-4 of Article 133 
TEC relating to trade in goods. By adding paragraphs 5-7 to Article 133 
TEC, it brought issues relating to the provision of services, establishment 
and IP protection under the auspices of the Common Commercial Policy, 
though providing numerous exceptions to the scope of EC competence. 
The lack of clarity concerning the concepts of “trade in services” and “com-
mercial aspects of intellectual property”, the establishment of shared and 
joined competence in paragraph 6 for only some services, and the explicit 
reference to international agreements, which implies that the adoption of 
autonomous measures in these areas is excluded, are only some of the 
criticisms levelled against the amendments introduced in Nice.15 
12  P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: legal and constitutional founda-
tions (OUP, Oxford, New York 2004) 29.
13  For a critical analysis of Opinion 1/94 see J Bourgeois, ‘The EC in the WTO and Advisory 
Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession’ (1995) 32 CML Rev 763; Hilf, ‘The ECJ’s Opinion 
1/94 on the WTO, No Surprise but Wise?’ (1995) 6 EJIL 245; T Tridimas, ‘The WTO and 
OECD Opinions’ in Dashwood and Hillion (eds), The general law of E.C. external relations 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London 2000) 48; P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart, 
Oxford, Portland 2006) 46-48.
14  Eeckhout (n 12) 57; Koutrakos (n 13) 47.
15  M Cremona, ‘A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy after Nice’ 
(2001) 4 CYELS 69; C Hermann, ‘Common Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus would 
have done a better job’ (2002) 39 CMLR 26.
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ii) Assimilating trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual 
property with trade in goods
Addressing these criticisms, the Lisbon Treaty introduces new word-
ing with regard to EU competence on trade in services and IP, enhanc-
ing clarity and preciseness. A fi rst striking difference to Article 133 TEC 
is that the Lisbon Treaty ends the distinction between trade in goods 
and trade in services and commercial aspects of IP. Articles 133(1) and 
133(5)(1) TEC are “merged”, so that trade in services and commercial 
aspects of IP are no longer a different category from trade in goods. Para-
graph 1 of Article 207 TFEU clearly stipulates that: 
The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of 
tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and serv-
ices, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign 
direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liber-
alisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to 
be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. (emphasis added)
Even though the assimilation of goods, services and commercial as-
pects of IP does not add to the current competence of the EC under Arti-
cle 133 TEC, it is obvious that their common reference in Article 207(1) 
TFEU simplifi es the delimitation of Union competence.
It is also remarkable that the Lisbon Treaty incorporates social, 
health, education and cultural services into the general scope of EU com-
petence under Article 207(1) TFEU. The confusing reference to shared 
competence in Article 133(6)(2) TEC has been abandoned,16 so that all 
services sectors fall under the general scope of EU competence. However, 
the elimination of Article 133(6)(2) TEC does not necessarily mean that 
the same rules also apply with regard to these services.17 Article 207(4) 
TFEU provides special decision-making rules concerning these services 
sectors and the general limitation established in Article 207(6) TFEU sug-
gests that the external aspects of the regulation of these services sectors 
do not fall entirely within the scope of Union competence. However, in 
any case, the elimination of Article 133(6)(2) TEC adds to the simplifi ca-
tion of the Common Commercial Policy.
In addition, Article 207 TFEU grants the possibility of concluding in-
ternational agreements and also adopting autonomous measures with re-
16  The second subparagraph of Article 133(6) TEC makes an explicit reference to “shared 
competence” with regard to employment, health, education and cultural services, which ar-
guably establishes a priori shared competence between the Community and Member States. 
Cremona (n 15) 73-74; HG Krenzler and C Pitschas, ‘Progress or Stagnation? The Common 
Commercial Policy After Nice’ (2001) 6 EFA Rev 308-309.
17  See below section 2.c.
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gard to trade in services and commercial aspects of IP. Contrary to Article 
133 TEC, which stipulates that the EC enjoys competence only to negoti-
ate and conclude international agreements,18 the Lisbon Treaty enables 
the EU to adopt autonomous measures with regard to all aspects of the 
Common Commercial Policy and not only trade in goods. As Article 207(1) 
TFEU does not distinguish between goods, services and commercial as-
pects of IP, Article 207(2) TFEU, which stipulates that the relevant Union 
institutions are vested with the power ‘to adopt measures defi ning the 
framework for implementing the Common Commercial Policy’, applies to 
all aspects of the Common Commercial Policy. Similar to current Article 
133(2) TEC, this provision should be read as enabling the Union to adopt 
autonomous measures, both in the form of substantive rules and rules 
necessary for the implementation of international agreements.19 The ad-
dition of the words ‘defi ning the framework’ in the Lisbon Treaty does not 
imply that the Union is only competent to defi ne the general framework 
for achieving its policy goals. On the contrary, it grants the fl exibility to 
the relevant institutions to decide the best means for implementing their 
policy goals. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty puts an end to the need to 
use different legal bases having different institutional and decision-mak-
ing rules to adopt autonomous measures with regard to trade in services 
and commercial aspects of IP.
iii) Defi ning “trade in services” and “commercial aspects of intellectual 
property”
Concerning the defi nition of trade in services and commercial as-
pects of IP, the Lisbon Treaty regrettably does not provide a defi nition of 
these terms. With regard to trade in services, the Lisbon Treaty remains 
silent on the debate whether this term is limited to services, as they are 
defi ned under the relevant EC Treaty chapter, or whether it refl ects the 
similar term found in the WTO Agreements, thus covering all four differ-
ent modes of supply of services provided in GATS, namely cross-frontier 
supply of services, consumption abroad and, more importantly, commer-
cial presence and movement of natural persons related to the supply of 
services.20 
During the negotiations at the European Convention, it became ob-
vious that the term should be used by reference to GATS, including all 
18  Cremona (n 15) 83.
19  Krajewksi (n 6) 107; J Ceyssens, ‘Towards a common foreign investment policy? – For-
eign investment in the European constitution’ (2005) 32 LIEI 276.
20  In favour of a wide interpretation of the term, see Cremona (n 15) 69-70. In favour of 
a narrow interpretation excluding commercial presence and movement of natural persons 
from its scope, see S Griller and B Weidel, External Economic Relations and Foreign Policy in 
the European Union (Springer, Vienna 2002) 91-93.
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modes for the supply of services, hence including establishment in serv-
ices sectors and movement of natural persons related to the supply of 
services.21 In favour of a broad interpretation of the term, there is also the 
fact that commercial presence is at the core of the new competence over 
foreign direct investment, which concerns the establishment of foreign 
investors in all economic sectors, thus in services sectors as well. Conse-
quently, the debate on the defi nition of trade in services and whether it 
covers movement of persons seems to have been rendered defunct.
At this point, it should be noted that the Lisbon Treaty not only af-
fi rms the currently predominant perception that trade in services should 
be interpreted by reference to GATS, but it also does away with the current 
fragmentation of the competence rules concerning the establishment of 
non-EU nationals in the EU and of EU nationals in third countries. Even 
though EC competence in the area of trade in services indicates that the 
Common Commercial Policy has been extended to two other important ar-
eas of the internal market, namely establishment and provision of services, 
it does not mean that the Common Commercial Policy refl ects the scope of 
Community powers in the internal fi eld. So far only the power to regulate 
the establishment of persons trading in services has been transferred to 
the Community, which means that the establishment of persons whose 
business activities do not involve trade is excluded from the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy.22 This distinction between establishment in 
the services and non-services sectors, which does not exist in the internal 
market, is abolished by the Lisbon Treaty, which adds foreign direct in-
vestment to the scope of the Common Commercial Policy, hence covering 
the establishment of foreign investors in all economic sectors.23
In contrast with trade in services, ambiguity seems to continue with 
regard to the defi nition of commercial aspects of IP. Even though it is 
widely accepted that the term should be interpreted by reference to the 
WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, the debate whether the term refl ects 
TRIPS as it stood at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty or as it will 
evolve remains open.24 The choice between a “static” or a “dynamic” defi -
nition of commercial aspects of IP becomes more crucial under the Lisbon 
Treaty, since a provision similar to Article 133(7) TEC, which grants the 
possibility to the Council to extend the scope of paragraphs 1-4 of Article 
133 TEC to the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on 
IP in general, is not included in the new text. Therefore, in contrast with 
21  Krajewksi (n 6) 110-111; Cremona (n 3) 30.
22  Ceyssens (n 19) 260.
23  See also below section 2.b.
24  Hermann (n 15) 18-19; Cremona (n 15) 71-72 and Koutrakos (n 13) 63 are in favour of a 
“static” interpretation, while Krenzler and Pitschas (n 16) 302 are in favour of a “dynamic” 
interpretation of the term.
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the static interpretation of the term preferred in light of Article 133 TEC, 
it now seems that leaving regulation of IP as a whole outside the scope of 
the Common Commercial Policy indicates that a dynamic interpretation 
of commercial aspects of IP should be adopted.25 A basic objective of the 
reform of the Common Commercial Policy was to grant competence to 
the Union to participate in the WTO and negotiate future amendments to 
WTO Agreements. Hence, the lack of a provision similar to Article 133(7) 
TEC probably indicates that commercial aspects of IP are not strictly con-
nected to the current TRIPS Agreement, but cover all issues that may be 
included in the TRIPS Agreement after a future WTO round.
The simplifi cation and clarifi cation of EU competence over trade in 
services and commercial aspects of IP presents a huge step towards a 
complete legal framework for external economic affairs. The Lisbon Trea-
ty signifi cantly enhances the link between EU competence and the WTO, 
allowing the EU to follow and actively participate in international devel-
opments and advance its position both internally and externally. Fur-
thermore, the assimilation of goods, services and IP suggests that the 
Common Commercial Policy refl ects to a large extent the internal market, 
where free movement of goods, services and establishment are of equal 
legal value. Also taking into account the addition of foreign direct invest-
ment to the scope of EU powers, the Common Commercial Policy seems 
to be departing from its “traditional” trade core and is becoming the basic 
tool not only for serving the external needs of the internal market but also 
for building an autonomous EU external economic policy.  
b) EU competence in the area of Foreign Direct Investment
The Lisbon Treaty establishes for the fi rst time an express compe-
tence over foreign investment by including it in the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy. Even though the debate over the inclusion of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) generated great controversy and criticism,26 the 
Lisbon Treaty, following the text of the Constitutional Treaty, extended 
the Common Commercial Policy to the second most important fi eld of in-
ternational economic relations, namely foreign investment. The express 
inclusion of FDI under the Common Commercial Policy is of the utmost 
importance, as it empowers the Union to take external action with re-
spect to most aspects of foreign investment regulation and facilitates the 
exercise of its current, fragmented and incomplete competence over for-
eign investment by establishing a single legal basis. However, the inclu-
25  Ceyssens (n 19) 260.
26  There were many suggestions at the European Convention which advocated that foreign 
investment should not be included within the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. See 
Krajewski (n 6) 104.
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sion of FDI as part of the Common Commercial Policy does not mean 
that the EU can take action under the new provision with regard to all 
matters concerning foreign investment regulation. In order to delimitate 
the scope of EU competence, it is necessary to examine fi rstly the catego-
ries of foreign investment and secondly the aspects of foreign investment 
regulation that are covered in Article 207 TFEU.   
i) Defi ning Foreign Direct Investment
It is apparent from the wording of Articles 206 and 207 TFEU that 
the new competence is limited only to foreign direct investment. Even 
though there is no further clarifi cation of the term in the Treaty, the con-
cept of FDI should be interpreted by reference to the Community rules on 
direct investment and, most importantly, in accordance with the notion 
of FDI in international law. Similar to the concept of trade in services, 
the international law defi nition of FDI is more important for defi ning FDI 
within the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. In Community law, 
the term direct investment is used in Article 57(2) TEC as well as in the 
capital directive.27 FDI is associated with establishment or participation 
in new or existing undertakings via equity or security holdings which are 
characterised by the existence of a lasting link and managerial control of 
their activity as well as with long-term loans.28 The concept of direct in-
vestment in Community law corresponds to the concept of direct invest-
ment in international law,29 which emphasises duration and managerial 
control as the main elements of FDI. The common determination of FDI 
in both Community and international law facilitates the interpretation of 
Articles 206 and 207 TFEU, which establish competence only with regard 
to foreign direct investments.30
As a result, portfolio investments, as well as other categories of foreign 
investment, for example IP rights, money claims and concession contracts, 
are excluded from the scope of the new competence.31 This exclusion does 
27  Council Directive [EEC] 88/361of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of 
the Treaty (1988) OJ L 178/5.
28  For example see Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-4581, para 53 and J Handoll, Capital, 
Payments and Money Laundering in the European Union (Richmond, Richmond 2006) 27-28.
29  For an analysis of the defi nition of investment in international investment law see N Ru-
bins, ‘The Notion of Investment in International Investment Arbitration’ in Horn (ed) Arbitra-
ting Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer, 2004) 284 ; F Yala, ‘The Notion of Investment in 
ICSID Case Law: A Drifting Jurisdictional Requirement?’ (2005) 22 Journal of International 
Arbitration 105.
30  Ceyssens (n 19) 274; Krajewski (n 6) 112; J Karl, ‘The Competence for Foreign Direct 
Investment’ (2003) 4 JWI&T  420.
31  The term foreign investment is used in international investment agreements very broadly 
so that it covers not only foreign direct investment but also any assets of an economic value 
as long as certain criteria are fulfi lled.
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not mean that the EU will not enjoy competence to take external action 
with regard to these categories of foreign investment. The express recogni-
tion of competence over FDI does not negate EU powers which are con-
ferred on it by virtue of other Treaty provisions. On the contrary, the EU 
will remain competent to the extent that the current Treaty empowers the 
Community to regulate these categories of foreign investment.
ii) The scope of Community competence over foreign investment in the EC 
Treaty
In order to assess the importance of the inclusion of FDI in the Com-
mon Commercial Policy, it is necessary to examine briefl y whether and 
to what extent the different aspects of foreign investment regulation cur-
rently fall within EC competence. A brief overview of the fragmented, in-
complete and complex system of Treaty rules enabling the Community 
to take external action on foreign investment illustrates the need for es-
tablishing an explicit legal basis for foreign investment and provides the 
necessary background for scrutinising the controversial aspects of the 
new FDI competence.
In a nutshell, foreign investment regulation touches upon diverse 
regulatory interests, as it mainly concerns the admission of foreign in-
vestment, its treatment and the protection of foreign investment against 
expropriation.32 Within this patchwork of distinct regulatory concerns, 
the EC has placed greater emphasis on admission of foreign investment. 
Aiming at liberalisation and market access, which have been the main 
tools used for economic integration in the internal market, the EC Treaty 
empowers the Community to take external action concerning the admis-
sion of foreign investment. Nevertheless, a specifi c legal basis has been 
missing so far and different Treaty provisions are used in order to cover 
this gap without always providing clear powers to the Community.33 Ar-
ticle 56 TEC provides for the liberalisation of capital movements to and 
from third countries, including capital movements related to foreign in-
vestment. However, the concept of capital movement and the relation 
of Article 56 TEC to the Treaty provisions on establishment probably 
indicate that its scope is limited only to the actual transfer of assets 
32  Originally the main subject of foreign investment regulation concerned the protection of 
foreign investors’ property from expropriation and the guarantee of a minimum standard 
of treatment. Over time, international foreign investment regulation has been expanded 
to standards of treatment of foreign investors and specifi c issues important for foreign 
investors such as performance requirements. Admission of foreign investment has been 
traditionally kept under national control but it has been incorporated gradually into inter-
national investment agreements. 
33  For a brief overview of EC competence over foreign investment see Ceyssens (n 19) 
260-262; W Shan, ‘Towards a common European community policy on investment issues’ 
(2001) 2 JWI&T 607-610.
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destined to be used for the establishment of an investor and not to the 
conditions of initial establishment as such.34 The initial establishment of 
foreign investors is covered partially by Article 133 TEC, as long as it is 
accepted that trade in services covers the commercial presence of foreign 
investors. Nevertheless, this provision is limited only to investments in 
services sectors. Complementing Article 133 TEC, the Treaty rules on es-
tablishment can arguably be considered to confer implied powers on the 
Community with regard to the initial establishment of foreign investors in 
all economic sectors. However, in accordance with the doctrine of implied 
powers, the existence of such implied powers requires that regulation of 
the activity of third country nationals in the EU as well as of EU nation-
als in third countries is necessary for the attainment of the objectives of 
the internal market, which is not always clear. Furthermore, such com-
petence is shared with Member States and exclusivity arises only if the 
criteria of AETR-type exclusivity are fulfi lled. Similar concerns exist with 
regard to the post-establishment treatment of foreign investors, where 
again the foundations of EC competence are rather obscure.35
Protection of foreign investment against expropriation is the most 
widely disputed fi eld of foreign investment regulation in terms of EC 
competence. Firstly, it is unclear whether expropriation of foreign invest-
ment is excluded from Community law interference by virtue of Article 
295 TEC, which safeguards the property ownership systems of Member 
States. Furthermore, it is also controversial whether the Community has 
the power to take positive action and determine the conditions under 
which expropriation of foreign investors’ property is legal and whether 
and to what extent the foreign investor is entitled to compensation. As a 
result, protection of foreign investment against expropriation has so far 
been completely excluded from Community agreements dealing with for-
eign investment, and this fi eld has been widely considered to fall within 
the exclusive competence of Member States.
iii) The scope of Union competence to regulate foreign investment under the 
Lisbon Treaty
The inclusion of FDI within the scope of the Common Commercial 
Policy provides a fi rst signifi cant step towards reassessing the delimita-
34  For an analysis of the relevance of Article 56 TEC for foreign investment regulation see 
R Torrent, ‘Derecho comunitario e Inversiones extranjeras directas: Libre circulacion de los 
capitales vs. Regulacion no discriminatoria del establecimiento. De la golden share a los 
nuevos Open Skies’ (2007) 22 Revista Espanola de derecho europeo 291.
35  The existence of implied powers with regard to the establishment of foreign investors has 
been indirectly recognised in Opinion 2/92 ([1995] ECR I-521), where the Court held that 
the Community enjoyed competence, albeit non-exclusive, to conclude the OECD National 
Treatment Instrument. For an analysis of the Opinion see Tridimas (n 13).
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tion of competence between the Union and Member States by simplifying 
the current complex system of rules, solidifying Union competence with 
regard to certain aspects of foreign investment regulation and offering a 
framework for establishing a common foreign investment policy. How-
ever, it is unclear whether Article 207 TFEU confers power on the Union 
to take action concerning all aspects of FDI regulation.
Firstly, issues of admission of foreign investment fall within the scope 
of FDI competence.36 Its placement under the Common Commercial Policy, 
which is based on principles of uniformity and liberalisation, reveals that 
FDI competence is primarily concerned with market access, hence allow-
ing the EU to take action with regard to the initial establishment of foreign 
investors. However, FDI competence partially overlaps with Union compe-
tence concerning trade in services, which covers establishment in services 
sectors. Even though as a matter of principle FDI competence should be 
considered as embracing establishment in all economic sectors, thus unit-
ing rules on establishment, the distinction between FDI and trade in serv-
ices is of minor practical signifi cance, as they are both part of the Common 
Commercial Policy and are subject to identical rules.
In contrast with initial establishment, it is unclear whether FDI com-
petence encompasses capital movements relating to FDI. Article 63 TFEU 
(ex 56 TEC) refers explicitly to capital movements to and from third coun-
tries, while Articles 64-66 TFEU (ex 57-59 TEC) establish specifi c rules 
concerning limitations on capital movements to and from third countries. 
It can be argued that the mere fact that measures adopted under the Com-
mon Commercial Policy have repercussions on certain economic sectors 
falling under other Treaty chapters does not constitute a reason to exclude 
them from the scope of the Common Commercial Policy.37 However, this 
is not necessarily the case for investment-related capital movements. In-
ternational investment agreements not only have effects on capital move-
ments, but also aim, among other things, to provide a framework for their 
liberalisation. On the other hand, Article 63 TFEU does not explicitly pro-
vide for the conclusion of international agreements, while Article 207 TFEU 
predominantly concerns EU action in the international sphere.
It is also unclear whether FDI competence includes all aspects of 
post-establishment treatment of foreign investors. Article 49 TFEU (ex 
43 TEC) remains the basic provision concerning treatment of EU com-
panies regardless of their ownership or control.38 However, Article 207 
36  Ceyssens (n 19) 276-277; Krajewski (n 6) 114; Karl (n 30) 421.
37  Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871 para 49; Ceyssens (n 19) 284.
38  Article 54 TFEU grants EU nationality to all fi rms having their registered offi ce, central 
administration or principal place of business in the EU, regardless of whether they are 
owned or controlled by foreign nationals. Hence, Article 54 TFEU obliges the EU to treat 
foreign investors established in its territory as EU nationals. 
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TFEU has a much broader scope, as it confers powers with regard to all 
foreign established persons, irrespective of whether they fulfi l the criteria 
of Article 54 TFEU (ex 48 TEC). Moreover, FDI competence is broader so 
as to explicitly include all standards of treatment of FDI, in particular 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET),39 and to cover the treatment of EU 
controlled or managed undertakings in third countries which do not fall 
straightforwardly within the scope of Union competence by virtue of es-
tablishment rules. 
Furthermore, the scope of FDI competence extends to specifi c aspects 
of foreign investment regulation, such as performance requirements and 
the movement of key personnel. Many of these issues are already cov-
ered by Community/Union competence, for example trade-related per-
formance requirements and movement of persons related to the supply 
of services.40 Article 207 TFEU expands Union competence with regard 
to most other performance requirements and movement of investment-
related key personnel. However, in this fi eld the limitation established 
in paragraph 6 of Article 207 TFEU becomes apparent. This preserves 
Member States’ powers in fi elds which are excluded entirely from Union 
interference or from harmonisation by means of Union legislation. For 
example, the EU cannot use its FDI competence to regulate issues fall-
ing outside the scope of its powers and nor can it use its competence to 
harmonise areas of law where harmonisation is ruled out, such as public 
health, cultural or social services.41
It is also noteworthy that FDI competence will provide a specifi c legal 
basis allowing for the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement provi-
sions in future Union agreements and for the conclusion of international 
agreements concerning investor-state dispute settlement, such as the IC-
SID Convention.42 However, dispute settlement mechanisms adopted in 
39  Ceyssens (n 19) argues that FET is excluded from the scope of new FDI competence. Bas-
ing his argument on parallelism, he asserts that FET is not regulated in the internal mar-
ket, and therefore it cannot be regulated in external relations. However, this argument does 
not take into account the fact that the lack of exercise of internal powers does not preclude 
in the framework of the Common Commercial Policy the exercise of external competence.
40  Trade-related performance requirements, such as import and export quotas, the use of 
local goods or services and the regulation of production rates are issues that are regulated 
in the TRIMs Agreement. The TRIMs Agreement is part of the WTO Multilateral Agreement 
on Trade in Goods, concerning which the Court manifestly declared in Opinion 1/94 (n 11 
para 34) that the Community is exclusively competent to conclude. For the movement of 
persons related to the supply of services see above in section 2.a.iii.  
41  For the precise scope of the limitation set out in Article 207(6) TFEU see below in sec-
tion 2.c. 
42  The question of EU competence to accede to the ICSID Convention is different from the 
question concerning the eligibility of the EC as a supranational organisation to accede to it 
as a matter of international law. As Article 67 of the ICSID Convention allows only States to 
accede to it, the Convention should be amended in order for the EU to become a contract-
ing party.
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Union agreements must conform to the jurisdictional limits set by Opin-
ions 1/9143 and 1/200344 so that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
is respected.
Finally, it is debatable whether Article 207 TFEU will bring protec-
tion of foreign investors against expropriation within EU competence, 
thus covering the most important aspect of foreign investment regulation 
which remains so far entirely outside the scope of Community regula-
tion. The exclusion of investment protection from the scope of the Com-
mon Commercial Policy is strongly advocated, based on the trade char-
acter of the Common Commercial Policy and the exclusion of investment 
protection from the scope of internal Union powers. With regard to the 
trade orientation of the Common Commercial Policy, it is argued that 
Article 207 TFEU cannot extend to measures of investment protection, as 
this goes beyond the “traditional” character of the Common Commercial 
Policy which concerns market access and the abolition of restrictions, 
hence covering only issues of establishment and post-establishment 
treatment.45 Article 206 TFEU provides that “the Union shall contribute, 
in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, 
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and 
on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other 
barriers” (emphasis added), thus not including FDI protection within its 
scope. However, this argument does not take into consideration the fact 
that the Common Commercial Policy has been expanded beyond trade, 
not only by the inclusion of foreign investment, but also by the inclusion 
of commercial aspects of IP that are mainly related to property protection 
and restrictions rather than liberalisation. In this regard, the notion of 
restrictions on FDI mentioned in Article 206 TFEU can be interpreted as 
including property protection restrictions, similar to the property protec-
tion restrictions abolished by TRIPS. The fact that Article 207 TFEU does 
not distinguish between trade in goods and other aspects of the Common 
Commercial Policy, as Article 133 TEC does, illustrates that the Lisbon 
Treaty is moving further away from the traditional trade orientation of the 
Common Commercial Policy, which is expanding towards other fi elds of 
economic activity.46
In addition, it is reasonable to exclude protection against expropria-
tion from the scope of the new FDI competence if Article 345 TFEU (ex 
295 TEC) is interpreted as safeguarding Member States’ powers with re-
gard to the entirety of the issues affecting their property regime. Moreo-
43  Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079.
44  Opinion 1/2003 [2006] ECR I-1.
45  Krajewski (n 6) 114.
46  Ceyssens (n 19) 278-279; Karl (n 30) 421.
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ver, if internal harmonisation of rules on expropriation is excluded from 
the scope of Articles 114, 115 and 352 TFEU (ex 95, 94 and 308 TEC), it 
is again obvious that the principle of parallelism affi rmed in paragraph 6 
of Article 207 TFEU excludes investment protection from the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy. 
With regard to Article 345 TFEU, it is arguable that it does not pre-
serve exclusive powers for Member States to determine expropriation. 
Article 345 TFEU has been interpreted narrowly so that its scope con-
cerns only the right of Member States to nationalise private property or to 
privatise public property.47 It reserves for Member States only the power 
to decide whether and when expropriation occurs and not the conditions 
under which such expropriation takes place. The latter, which is the sub-
ject of foreign investment regulation, does not fall under the scope of Ar-
ticle 345 TFEU.48 On the contrary, it is arguable the EU has the right to 
determine the conditions of indirect expropriation of foreign investment 
resulting from Union measures,49 while it can also harmonise national 
laws on conditions of expropriation resulting from national measures. 
The power to harmonise rules on the exercise of property rights has al-
ready been used in the fi eld of IP rights and it can be considered in many 
instances necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the internal 
market. Even though the internal power for harmonisation has not been 
used so far, this does not imply that external competence does not exist, 
as this would negate the foundations of the principle of parallelism which 
determines the scope of EU external competence.50 
As a result of the inclusion of FDI within the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy, the Lisbon Treaty has taken a huge step towards 
establishing the Common Commercial Policy as the basic tool of exter-
nal economic action. Movement of persons between the Union and third 
countries, with the exception of labour movement, which is dealt with in 
the Treaty chapter on Justice, Security and Home Affairs, becomes part 
of the scope of the Common Commercial Policy, thus completing paral-
47  For example in Costa v ENEL (Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 1251) and in Fearon (Case 182/83 
[1984] ECR 3677) the Court clearly stated that Article 295 TEC does not preclude the ap-
plication of community rules in the fi eld of property expropriation. The narrow scope of 
Article 295 TEC has also been fi rmly recognised in the fi eld of IP, where the Court found 
that regulation of IP rights concerning not only their exercise but also their existence can 
be adopted at Community level.
48  C Von Milczewski, Der grundrechtliche Schutz des Eigentums im Europäischen Gemein-
schaftsrecht (Peter Lang Frankfurt, New York 1994) 23-30.
49  The Court has recognised in Nold (Case 4/73 [1974] ECR 491) and in Bosphorus (Case 
C-84/95 [1996] ECR I-3953) that there are general principles of Community law that safe-
guard property rights and determine the conditions under which these rights can be limited 
by Community law.
50  Cf Ceyssens (n 19) 281.
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lelism between internal and external powers as far as the existence of EU 
competence is concerned.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Article 207 TFEU vests the Un-
ion with signifi cant powers in the fi eld of foreign investment and ena-
bles it to substitute Member States in the international sphere. Given, 
however, the plethora of contractual commitments undertaken so far by 
Member States, which have concluded more than 1,000 Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties with third countries, it is still unclear whether, when and 
how the Union will exercise its new powers. The lack of clarity concerning 
the substantive scope of FDI competence in conjunction with the legisla-
tive changes required, in particular with regard to investment protection, 
adds to the speculation concerning the willingness of Member States to 
accept the transfer of their powers to the EU and future challenges by 
them to EU action in this fi eld.
c) Limitations of Union competence
The expansion of the Common Commercial Policy to trade in serv-
ices, FDI and commercial aspects of IP has rendered necessary the es-
tablishment of an explicit link between the internal market and external 
action. The need to avoid the paradox of an external competence super-
seding internal powers was expressed in Article 133(6) TEC which paral-
lelises internal and external powers and curbs Community competence 
with regard to certain services sectors. After the Lisbon Treaty, the need 
for parallelism between internal and external action has become greater 
than before, as FDI has been included within the scope of Union compe-
tence and Article 207 TFEU does not distinguish between goods, services, 
FDI and commercial aspects of IP. Hence, similar to the current Article 
133 TEC, the Lisbon Treaty provides in Article 207(6) TFEU for limita-
tions upon Union competence in the fi eld of the Common Commercial 
Policy based on the principle of parallelism. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty adopts a different approach towards 
parallelism. In the fi rst sentence of paragraph 6 of Article 207 TFEU, a 
general parallelism clause is established so that ‘The exercise of the com-
petences conferred by this Article in the fi eld of the Common Commercial 
Policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union 
and the Member States’. The second sentence of the same paragraph 
provides a limitation on the content of measures that can be taken under 
Article 207 TFEU so that the exercise of Union competences ‘shall not 
lead to harmonization of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Mem-
ber States insofar as the Treaties exclude such harmonization’.
Starting with the second sentence of Article 207(6) TFEU, the word-
ing resembles to a great extent the limitation of EC competence found in 
Article 133(6) TEC. The exercise of Union powers is limited in fi elds where 
118 Angelos Dimopoulos: The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism...
harmonisation is excluded by the Treaty, which means that the Common 
Commercial Policy cannot be used for the adoption of Union measures 
in fi elds in which other Treaty provisions allow only limited Union inter-
ference.51 However, this provision should not be broadly interpreted as 
requiring full harmonisation in a specifi c fi eld. As has already been con-
vincingly argued under the EC Treaty,52 the text is clear that only areas 
where harmonisation is excluded fall outside the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy, which means that it includes areas of law where the 
EC Treaty provides for minimum harmonisation. 
This specifi c limitation of Union competence is part of the broader 
parallelism principle which is established in the fi rst sentence of para-
graph 6. Article 207(6)(a) TFEU establishes explicit parallelism between 
internal and external EU competences in the sense that external powers 
cannot be used to override the limits of internal Union competence with 
regard to the same subject matter.53 Consequently, when the Union ex-
ercises its powers under the Common Commercial Policy, it is subject to 
the same limitations on its competence that exist in the internal market 
with regard to the same subject matter. However, this does not mean 
that the lack of exercise of Union internal competences poses a limitation 
on the existence or the exercise of external competence. It is remarkable 
that the requirement of unanimity for the adoption of commercial policy 
measures in cases where no internal measures have been adopted, has 
not been incorporated in Article 207(4) TFEU, thus proving that a lack of 
internal rules is no impediment to the adoption of external action even at 
the procedural level.54 As a result, the Union can take action in all areas 
of the Common Commercial Policy to the extent that it is competent to 
legislate in this area of the internal market, even if it has not acted so far, 
for example in the fi eld of property expropriation.55
Taking into account the negotiating history of the Constitutional 
Treaty and the fact that the limitation of paragraph 6 applies to all ar-
eas of the Common Commercial Policy and to both the adoption of au-
tonomous measures and the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements, it is argued that this limitation refers only to internal im-
plementing powers and not to the competence to negotiate and conclude 
51  Ceyssens (n 19) 280; Krajewski (n 6) 115.
52  Hermann (n 15) 22.
53  As Ceyssens rightly argues, a literal understanding of the fi rst sentence makes little 
sense, since the Common Commercial Policy concerns economic activities which are not 
covered by the internal market provisions, as the latter are limited to EU nationals or intra-
community movement of goods.
54  See below section 4.a.
55  See above section 2.biii.
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international agreements.56 Drawing a parallel with federal states, which 
have the power to conclude international agreements on issues that are 
internally beyond the scope of their federal legislative competence, it was 
argued that the Constitutional Treaty brought a similar change to the 
scope of EU external powers in the fi eld of the Common Commercial Pol-
icy. However, this position does not take into account the fact that in the 
new Treaty as well as in the Constitutional Treaty EU powers are based 
on the principle of attribution,57 so that the Union has only the compe-
tences conferred on it by Member States. The principle of parallelism 
constitutes one of the cornerstones of external competence, especially in 
the fi eld of implied powers, so that its complete negation in the fi eld of 
Common Commercial Policy would diminish its value. In addition, the EU 
is far from becoming a federal state where external powers are exclusively 
exercised at the “federal” level.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Lisbon Treaty retains the 
exclusion of transport services from the scope of the Common Commer-
cial Policy. Following the reasoning of the Court in Opinion 1/94 that 
Community competence with regard to transport services is established 
only within the limits set in the respective Treaty chapter,58 the Lisbon 
Treaty provides in Article 207(5) TFEU that ‘the negotiation and conclu-
sion of international agreements in the fi eld of transport shall be subject 
to Title V of Part Three and to Article 188 N’.
3. The nature of Union competence in the fi eld of the Common 
Commercial Policy
a) Exclusivity of Union competence
The Lisbon Treaty impacts not only on the scope of EU competence 
in the fi eld of the Common Commercial Policy, but also on the nature 
of EU competence. The importance of the nature of EU competence be-
comes easily apparent, considering that the majority of external compe-
tence cases relate to the question of whether EU competence in a given 
fi eld is exclusive or shared with Member States, as it is only the recog-
nition of exclusive competence that renders the EU the sole normative 
actor in a specifi c fi eld. The Lisbon Treaty brings signifi cant innovations 
56  Krajewski (n 6) 116-117.
57  Article 5 TEU (ex 5 TEC) provides that ‘1. The limits of Union competences are governed 
by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. 2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act 
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union 
in the Treaties remain with the Member States.’
58  N 11.
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with regard to the nature of EU competence in the fi eld of the Common 
Commercial Policy, as it solidifi es the exclusive nature of EU competence 
with regard to trade in goods and expands exclusivity beyond goods in all 
other areas of the Common Commercial Policy.
The recognition of the exclusivity of Community powers was one of 
the major characteristics of the Common Commercial Policy that enabled 
its development into one of the most important fi elds of EC action. At a 
time when the basic principles of EC external relations law, such as the 
doctrine of implied powers,59 were formulated by the Court of Justice, 
the Court found that Member States could not legislate in an area which 
would affect the operation of the Common Commercial Policy, even if the 
Community had not yet taken any action in the fi eld.60 The a priori pre-
emption of Member States’ powers was justifi ed by the internal market 
need for the existence of uniform rules and the need to preserve the unity 
of the Community’s position with respect to third countries and to defend 
the “common interests” of the Community.61 Hence, even though the EC 
Treaty did not make any reference to exclusive powers in the fi eld of the 
Common Commercial Policy, exclusivity was judicially recognised with 
regard to trade in goods based on internal market and external represen-
tation rationales.
Differentiating from the “traditional” Common Commercial Policy, 
the Nice Treaty established complex rules with regard to the nature of 
EC competence in the new areas of trade in services and commercial 
aspects of IP. Article 133(5)(4) TEC provides for shared competence in 
the area, grandfathering prior Member State agreements, and reaffi rming 
their right to conclude new agreements in these areas.62 However, it is 
controversial whether, and to what extent, the principle of implied exclu-
sivity63 applies in the fi eld.64 It is unclear whether Community action in 
59  Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263.
60  Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355.
61  For an analysis of the a priori exclusive character of Community competence in the fi eld 
of the Common Commercial Policy see Koutrakos (n 13) 13-17.
62  Cremona (n 15) 84; Hermann (n 15) 19; Krenzler and Pitschas (n 16) 306.
63  Exclusivity of implied powers (AETR exclusivity) arises in circumstances where common 
rules have been adopted and exclusivity is necessary to avoid any effect on the common rules 
which may result from autonomous action taken by Member States. Implied exclusivity will 
arise in particular where there is complete harmonisation of a given area of law, where there 
exists internal legislation relating to treatment of nationals of non-Member States and fi nally 
where the power to negotiate with non-Member States has been conferred on Community 
institutions. See Opinion 1/94 (n 11) paras 76-78, 96 and Case C-467/98 Commission v 
Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519 paras 104-111 (Open Skies case). For an analysis of AETR type 
exclusivity see Koutrakos (n 13) 84-88, 110-112; Eeckhout (n 12) 59-64, 92-94.
64  Cremona (n 15) 86; Hermann (n 15) 19; cf Krenzler and Pitschas (n 16) 306; R Hold-
gaard, ‘The European Community’s Implied External Competence after the Open Skies 
Cases’ (2003) 8 EFA Rev, 386.
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this specifi c fi eld renders EC competence automatically exclusive, while 
in practice the need for concrete application of the exclusivity criteria for 
each services sector and IP protection norm renders the exact delimita-
tion of Community exclusive competence practically unmanageable. Fur-
thermore, the reference to joined competence in Article 133(6)(2) TEC, 
as has already been discussed,65 complicates the determination of the 
nature of EC competence in the fi eld.
In sharp contrast with the existing regime, the Lisbon Treaty explic-
itly recognises that Union competence in the fi eld of the Common Com-
mercial Policy is exclusive. Given the assimilation of all areas of the Com-
mon Commercial Policy, it is strongly arguable that exclusivity covers 
not only trade in goods, but also trade in services, FDI and commercial 
aspects of IP.66
Article 3(1)e TFEU clearly stipulates that the Common Commercial 
Policy falls within the exclusive competence of the Union, while Article 
2(1) TFEU integrates the principle that express powers are of an a priori 
exclusive nature. In contrast with the previous regime, exclusivity is not 
only relevant for the traditional scope of the Common Commercial Policy, 
but also includes trade in services, commercial-related aspects of IP and 
FDI. It is notable that Article 207 TFEU does not include a provision simi-
lar to Article 133(5)(4) TEC, which retained the right of Member States 
to maintain and conclude agreements with third countries. Article 207 
TFEU does not distinguish between the different aspects of the Common 
Commercial Policy in terms of competence, nor does Article 3 TFEU limit 
its scope to trade in goods. In addition, the fact that there are exceptional 
rules concerning voting requirements for trade in services, commercial 
aspects of IP and FDI has no implications for the exclusive character of 
Union competence, which is by no means affected by the need for una-
nimity in decision-making.
In addition, the limitation set in paragraph 6 of Article 207 TFEU 
cannot be interpreted as carving out exclusivity in the areas where the 
Union does not have exclusive competence in the internal sphere. Para-
graph 6 concerns the internal powers of Member States and establishes 
parallelism by excluding Union exclusive competence in the areas where 
the Union does not enjoy any competence internally. It cannot be in-
terpreted as establishing shared competence with regard to all areas of 
the Common Commercial Policy that internally fall under shared compe-
tence. This would contradict the clear recognition of exclusivity in Article 
2 TFEU as well as the long established recognition of exclusivity in the 
fi eld of trade in goods. For example, exclusivity would not cover certain is-
65  See above section 2.ai.
66  Cremona (n 3) 30; Ceyssens (n 19) 286-287; Krajewski (n 6) 108-109.
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sues relating to trade in goods, such as quantitative restrictions. As they 
fall outside the scope of the customs union, but within the scope of the 
internal market, which is now expressly an area of shared competence, 
and since paragraph 6 does not distinguish between trade in goods and 
other aspects of the Common Commercial Policy, this would imply that 
aspects of external trade in goods are also an area of shared competence, 
subject only to AETR-type exclusivity.
b) Breaking parallelism between internal and external powers?
Even though the recognition of exclusive Union competence clarifi es 
and solidifi es EU powers in the fi eld of the Common Commercial Policy, 
it presents the fi rst signifi cant deviation from the principle of parallelism 
between internal and external powers. In the internal market, exclusiv-
ity of Union powers arises only after their exercise, in accordance with 
the principles of subsidiarity and pre-emption. In this regard, the Lisbon 
Treaty appears to take a step back from the balance between internal and 
external powers that is currently safeguarded by the existence of shared 
competence over trade in services and commercial aspects of IP, which 
refl ects the delimitation of competence in these areas in the framework of 
the internal market.
However, exclusivity of Union powers is necessary in external eco-
nomic relations in order to enhance the simplifi cation and effective ap-
plication of the Common Commercial Policy. Advanced internal economic 
integration solidifi es the existence of a single, common Community inter-
est in all economic fi elds which is better served if the Union is the only 
actor in the international arena. In addition, the individual interests of 
Member States in sensitive sectors are not undermined, as they play a 
decisive role in formulating the Common Commercial Policy, especially in 
fi elds where unanimity is required for decision-making.67 The exclusive 
nature of Union competence does not imply that Member States can no 
longer pursue their policies in this fi eld; on the contrary it affects only 
their means of action in the sense that Member States are obliged to act 
within the institutional framework of the Union, contributing to the for-
mulation of the Common Commercial Policy.  
Despite the lack of balance between internal and external powers, 
the exclusive character of Union competence in the fi eld of the Com-
mon Commercial Policy should not be broadly interpreted as affecting 
the exercise of Member States’ internal concurrent powers. Even though 
measures adopted under the Common Commercial Policy can potentially 
lead to internal harmonisation in a specifi c area, this does not mean 
that the EU is exclusively competent to regulate in this fi eld. Exclusiv-
67  See below in section 4.a.
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ity under the Common Commercial Policy appears only in relations with 
third countries, in fi elds where the Union is vested with the power to 
take measures internally and to the extent that harmonisation achieved 
through the adoption of such measures is allowed.
4. Decision-making procedures
Until now, the adoption of decisions by the Council, excluding the 
Parliament from any interference with the exercising of Community pow-
ers, and the complex rules determining whether decisions should be 
adopted on the basis of qualifi ed majority voting (QMV) or unanimity 
were the two basic characteristics of decision-making procedures in the 
fi eld of the Common Commercial Policy.68 The Lisbon Treaty introduces 
new provisions on decision-making of paramount importance. Adding to 
the simplifi cation of the Common Commercial Policy, enhancing paral-
lelism with regard to voting requirements and granting a signifi cant role 
to the Parliament, the Lisbon Treaty brings legitimacy to the formation 
of the Common Commercial Policy and solidifi es the effectiveness of its 
implementation. 
Before discussing the innovative provisions on decision-making, 
it is worth noting that the Lisbon Treaty, following the current rules, 
recognises the signifi cant role played by the Commission in the fi eld of 
the Common Commercial Policy. The Commission is given the privilege 
of submitting proposals to the Council for the adoption of autonomous 
measures and to make recommendations for the negotiation and conclu-
sion of an international agreement.69 The Commission is also entrusted 
with the task of carrying out negotiations with third countries, after a 
mandate to open negotiations is granted by the Council, and ensuring 
the compatibility of agreements negotiated under Article 207 TFEU with 
internal Community policies and rules.70 
68  Koutrakos (n 13) 147-148; Cremona (n 15) 77-78
69  With regard to the adoption of autonomous measures, paragraph 2 of Article 207 TFEU 
refers to ordinary legislative procedure, according to which the initiation of legislative pro-
posals belongs primarily to the Commission. With regard to the conclusion of international 
agreements, paragraph 3 of Article 207 TFEU explicitly provides that ‘The Commission 
shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the necessary 
negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the 
agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Union policies and rules’.
70  Article 207(3)(3) TFEU provides that ‘The Commission shall conduct these negotiations 
in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission 
in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The 
Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the European Parliament 
on the progress of negotiations’.
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a) Voting requirements in the Council
Similar to the current regime, QMV is the basic rule determining 
decision-making in the fi eld of the Common Commercial Policy. Article 
207 TFEU states in paragraph 2 that ‘The European Parliament and the 
Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures …’ (emphasis added) 
and in paragraph 4(1) that ‘For the negotiation and conclusion of the 
agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the Council shall act by a qualifi ed 
majority’. Hence, it is clear that the adoption of internal measures and 
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements are subject 
to qualifi ed majority voting. These provisions establish a common regime 
for all aspects of the Common Commercial Policy without distinguishing 
between goods, services, FDI or commercial aspects of IP. In this regard, 
the Lisbon Treaty follows the pattern of merging the different aspects of 
the Common Commercial Policy at the procedural level as well.
As an exception to the QMV rule, paragraph 4 of Article 207 TFEU 
requires unanimity in certain instances, which apply only with regard to 
trade in services, FDI and commercial aspects of IP. Article 207(4) TFEU 
incorporates the rationale of the current provision and recognises the 
need for unanimity in these areas, which refl ect aspects of the internal 
market where decision-making internally is sometimes subject to differ-
ent voting requirements.71 However, this provision leaves less scope for 
ambiguities than Article 133(5)(4) TEC and adds signifi cantly to the es-
tablishment of parallelism between internal and external powers at the 
procedural level.
More specifi cally, Article 207(4)(2) TFEU adopts a similar wording to 
current Article 133(5)(4)(1) TEC. It provides that: 
For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fi elds of 
trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, 
as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unani-
mously where such agreements include provisions for which una-
nimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. 
Bearing in mind that legislating in the internal market requires una-
nimity in specifi c fi elds,72 the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty also kept the 
derogation from the QMV rule, insofar as such “derogation” exists, inter-
nally.73 
71  Hermann (n 15) 23; Cremona (n 15) 77-78.
72  For example unanimity is required in the internal market for the adoption of restrictions 
on freedom of establishment and services, for harmonisation of indirect taxation and ap-
proximation of laws. 
73  Ceyssens (n 19) 284-285; Krajewski (n 6) 119-120.
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In contrast with the current regime, the Lisbon Treaty does away 
with the provision according to which unanimity is required for the ne-
gotiation and conclusion of international agreements on subject matters 
over which internal powers have not been exercised yet. This provision is 
highly controversial, in particular with regard to the determination of the 
internal rules that are necessary for avoiding unanimity and the assess-
ment to what extent they should cover the topic of the proposed agree-
ment.74 Furthermore, it breaches the principle of parallelism, as it allows 
a Member State to block international agreements on a subject matter 
even though it could not obstruct the adoption of internal legislation in 
that fi eld. Abolishing this derogation from the QMV rule, the Lisbon Trea-
ty establishes complete parallelism between internal and external compe-
tences and avoids the ambiguities that are raised with regard to the scope 
and extent of internal rules that currently need to exist in order for QMV 
to apply.75 Consequently, Article 207(4)(2) TFEU ensures that the balance 
between internal and external powers is kept, without, however, affecting 
the effectiveness of decision-making procedures.
In addition, Article 207(4)(3) TFEU requires unanimity for the nego-
tiation and conclusion of international agreements ‘in the fi eld of trade in 
cultural and audiovisual services where these agreements risk prejudic-
ing the Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity’ and ‘in the fi eld of trade 
in social, education and health services where these risk seriously dis-
turbing the national organization of such services and prejudicing the re-
sponsibility of Member States to deliver them.’ This provision resembles 
to a great extent the unanimity rule provided in current Article 133(6) 
TEC with regard to the same services sectors. However, subparagraph 3 
of Article 207(4) TFEU does not require unanimity where trade in these 
services sectors is concerned. It is only when the conclusion of an inter-
national agreement poses risks to cultural and linguistic diversity and 
the national organisation and delivery of these services that unanimity is 
required. Consequently, this provision requires a risk assessment when-
ever trade in these services sectors is concerned. However, the Treaty 
does not provide the means on how such risk assessments should be 
conducted, and nor does it establish minimum levels of risk that should 
exist in order for unanimity to apply.76 Arguably, this ambiguity may re-
sult in the application of the unanimity rule in all cases concerning trade 
in these services sectors, thus recognising the concerns of a number of 
Member States who insisted on the inclusion of subparagraph 3 in the 
fi nal text of Article 207(4) TFEU.
74  For the interpretation of this provision see Hermann (n 15) 23-24; Krenzler and Pitschas 
(n 16) 305-306; Cremona (n 15) 77.
75  Krajewski (n 6Error! Bookmark not defi ned.) 121.
76  Ibid 122.
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In addition, Article 207 TFEU does not make any reference to hori-
zontal agreements as Article 133 TEC does. The lack of a provision re-
quiring unanimity in such cases should not be interpreted as abandon-
ing the need for unanimity when unanimity is required for the adoption 
of part of an international agreement in accordance with subparagraphs 
2 and 3 of Article 207(4) TFEU.77 On the contrary, it is arguable that in 
cases of international trade agreements dealing with a variety of subjects 
such as future WTO agreements, unanimity will be required for their 
negotiation and their conclusion, as long as they cover issues that fall 
under the unanimity rule.
b) The role of the European Parliament
The most important change brought by the Lisbon Treaty with re-
gard to decision-making in the fi eld of the Common Commercial Policy 
affects the institutional balance which has been struck, as it provides 
a more active role for the Parliament. Following the trend of granting a 
wider role to the Parliament and enhancing the legitimacy of external re-
lations, Article 207 alongside Article 218 TFEU render the Parliament a 
co-legislator in the fi eld of the Common Commercial Policy.
Article 207(2) TFEU expressly stipulates that the Parliament and the 
Council defi ne the framework for the implementation of the Common 
Commercial Policy in accordance with ordinary legislative procedure. As 
Article 294 TFEU (ex Article 251 TEC) requires the consent of the Parlia-
ment for the adoption of internal legislation in accordance with ordinary 
legislative procedure, the conclusion can be drawn that Article 207(2) 
TFEU renders the Parliament a co-legislator in the fi eld of the Common 
Commercial Policy as far as the adoption of autonomous measures is 
concerned.78 In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a radical change 
to decision-making rules in the fi eld of the Common Commercial Policy, 
as the Parliament acquires an indispensable role in its formation and 
implementation.
The consent of the Parliament is necessary not only for the adoption 
of autonomous measures, but also for the negotiation and conclusion of 
77  The question whether unanimity is required not only in cases where the subject matters 
requiring unanimity form a substantial part of the proposed agreement but also in cases 
where they are ancillary to the main subject matter of the agreement, which was controver-
sial under the previous regime (Hermann (n 15) 24; Cremona (n 15) 82), is not raised under 
Article 207 TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty does not provide a defi nition of horizontal agreements 
as ‘agreements that concern also the areas that are covered by the unanimity rule’ (empha-
sis added), thus indicating that unanimity is necessary not only when an agreement “con-
cerns” a fi eld where unanimous voting is required, but each time such a fi eld is included 
in the agreement.
78  Krajewski (n 6) 123; Cremona (n 3) 30; Koutrakos (n 13) 150.
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international agreements, which is the basic means of action in the fi eld 
of the Common Commercial Policy.79 Article 207(4) TFEU refers to Article 
218 TFEU, which provides the general procedural rules for the adoption 
of all international agreements, while Article 218(1) TFEU recognises that 
its provisions apply to the negotiation and conclusion of all internation-
al agreements. Hence, Article 218 TFEU applies to trade agreements as 
well, subject to the procedural rules contained in Article 207 TFEU on 
the Common Commercial Policy. Given that Article 207 TFEU establishes 
in paragraphs 3 and 4 detailed rules concerning the negotiation of com-
mercial policy agreements and decision-making in the Council, it is ar-
guable that paragraph 6 of Article 218 TFEU, which concerns the role of 
the Parliament at the stage of the conclusion of international agreements, 
also applies to commercial policy agreements.80 The application of Article 
218(6) TFEU to commercial policy agreements is further supported by 
the fact that this paragraph does not contain an explicit derogation for 
commercial policy agreements from its scope, as Article 300(3) TEC cur-
rently does. 
Even though Article 218(6) TFEU grants as a rule a consultative role 
to the Parliament with regard to the negotiation and conclusion of inter-
national agreements, the consent of the Parliament is required in the spe-
cifi c cases enumerated in subparagraph (2)(a) of Article 218(6) TFEU. The 
last indent of Article 218(6)(2)(a) TFEU states that the consent of the Par-
liament is necessary for the conclusion of international agreements that 
cover ‘fi elds to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or 
the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parlia-
ment is required’. Consequently, as the Common Commercial Policy is a 
fi eld where the ordinary legislative procedure applies for the adoption of 
autonomous legislation, the consent of the Parliament is also required for 
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements.81
Even though this provision establishes another form of “parallelism” 
between autonomous measures and international agreements, this time 
at the institutional level, it is arguable that it breaks the institutional 
balance between the internal and external competences of the Union. In 
the internal market, there are still areas to which the ordinary legislative 
79  It is also noteworthy that Article 207(3) TFEU also grants a formal role to the Parliament 
at the stage of negotiation of international agreements, as it requires that the Commission 
reports to the Parliament during the negotiations of international trade agreements. This 
reference to the Parliament is new in the Lisbon Treaty and imposes a legal obligation on 
the Commission to inform the Parliament at the negotiations stage. However, given that 
the Commission already informs the Parliament on trade negotiations, this provision would 
only solidify the role of the Parliament during the negotiation of international agreements 
falling within the scope of the Common Commercial Policy.
80  Krajewski (n 6) 122-124.
81  Ibid.
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procedure does not apply and decision-making is assigned only to the 
Council. Even though the Treaty rules on establishment, services and 
capital make explicit references to the ordinary legislative procedure,82 
Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 94 TEC) on approximation of laws relat-
ing to the movement of persons as well as Article 113 TFEU on indirect 
taxation grant only a consultative role to the Parliament. In this regard, 
the consent of the Parliament is required for the adoption of harmonis-
ing measures concerning the movement of persons and indirect taxation 
with regard to third countries within the framework of the Common Com-
mercial Policy, even though the adoption of measures on the same sub-
ject matter within the framework of the internal market would not require 
the consent of the European Parliament. 
Nevertheless, similar to the exclusive nature of Union competence, 
this derogation from parallelism appears necessary in order to ensure the 
effective application of the Common Commercial Policy. A common ap-
proach to decision-making can lead to the avoidance of inter-institutional 
confl icts and to the formation of a nuanced policy approach. In addition, 
the enhancement of democratic legitimacy of external economic relations 
beyond the degree of internal democratic legitimacy should be viewed 
positively, as it demonstrates the need for a more active role of the Parlia-
ment in economic affairs and external relations.  
The simplifi cation of the voting rules, mirroring internal market leg-
islative procedures, and the establishment of the Parliament as a co-leg-
islator indicate that the reform of the Common Commercial Policy con-
cerns not only the scope and nature of Union competence but also its 
exercise. The integration of trade in goods, services, commercial aspects 
of IP and FDI is also accomplished with regard to decision-making in a 
clear and coherent manner, enabling the Union to exercise its powers 
more effectively in the future. 
5. Conclusions
The Lisbon Treaty constitutes a benchmark in the evolution of the 
Common Commercial Policy and introduces a new era in EU external re-
lations. Building upon the premises of the current regime, it contributes 
to the development of a coherent, effective and all-embracing Common 
Commercial Policy, and refl ects the degree of internal economic integra-
tion in the fi eld of external relations. The expansion of the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy to trade in services, commercial aspects of IP 
and, most importantly, FDI indicates that a common policy in the fi elds of 
goods, services, establishment and capital with regard to third countries 
82  Articles 49-53 (ex 43-47TEC), 56 (ex 49 TEC), 64 (57 TEC) TFEU make references to the 
ordinary legislative procedure.
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is needed in order to serve the goals of internal integration and to in-
crease the competitiveness of Europe in the world. Merging the different 
areas of the Common Commercial Policy and simplifying the provisions 
concerning the exercise of EU competence, the Lisbon Treaty ensures 
its effective application in an increasingly globalised world. However, the 
“merger” of the different fi elds does not affect the balance of powers that 
exists in the internal market with regard to the same areas of law. On 
the contrary, Article 207 TFEU respects the delimitation of competence 
between the EU and Member States, as well as the institutional balance 
which is expressed in its decision-making provisions. Paragraphs 4 and 
6 of Article 207 TFEU state in a simplifi ed and clear manner that internal 
limitations on the scope and exercise of Union competence also exist with 
regard to trade and economic relations with third countries. The only 
derogations from parallelism between internal and external powers con-
cern the exclusive nature of EU competence and the role of the European 
Parliament. However, they are both necessary for preserving the effective-
ness of Union policy and bringing legitimacy to the most important fi eld 
of EU external relations.
